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Abstract 
First, using a small theoretically founded general equilibrium model fitted to the data by 
Bayesian techniques, the article assesses the contribution of interest rates and housing 
prices to dispersions within the European Monetary Union (EMU). It finds that the dif-
ferent behavior of interest rates just before and after the introduction of the euro has con-
tributed significantly to growth dispersions in the EMU. However, this has been a one-off 
shock whose effects, particularly on construction, should decline over time. Second, the ar-
ticle analyzes the contribution of the financial system to sharing country-specific risks in 
a panel framework. It finds that further financial sector integration in the EMU could do 
much more to insure countries against shocks and increase consumption smoothing.  
1. Introduction 
A better understanding of the driving forces of European Monetary Union 
(EMU) inflation and growth dispersions is important from both analytical and policy 
standpoints. The role of income and price level convergence as well as the relative im-
portance of country-specific versus common shocks in explaining dispersions has 
been analyzed in (Stavrev, 2008). This study extends the analysis in two ways. First, 
it studies the relative importance of transmission channels, in particular, the contri-
bution of real interest rate and the real estate sector to the dispersions. Second, it 
examines the potential of further financial integration in insuring against country- 
-specific shocks and reducing dispersions.  
The article analyzes these questions by using two approaches. First, it assesses 
the role of the interest rate and the housing sector in the adjustment process before 
and after euro introduction, using Bayesian techniques to fit a small theoretically 
founded general equilibrium model to the data. Second, the article analyzes the con-
tribution of the financial system to consumption and income smoothing across EMU 
countries by sharing country-specific risks, using a panel framework.  
Several results come out of the analysis. First, the different behavior of interest 
rates just before and after the introduction of the euro has contributed significantly to 
growth dispersions. However, this has been a one-off shock whose effects are declining 
over time. Second, and related to the interest rate shock, the construction sector has 
contributed to the growth dispersions. Third, financial sector integration could do much 
more to insure countries against shocks and increase consumption smoothing. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the findings in the literature. Section 3 analyzes the role of shock transmission and 
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the relative importance of channels, Section 4 looks at the role of the financial sector 
for cross-country consumption smoothing, while Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Cyclical synchronization has increased and shock propagation has become 
more similar since the introduction of the EMU. Giannone and Reichlin (2006) find 
that business cycles and shock propagation are similar across EMU countries and 
the bulk of euro-area dispersions are explained by relatively small but persistent idio-
syncratic shocks. They also note that the EMU adjusts more sluggishly to shocks 
than the United States, but that cycles are less volatile. Eickmeir (2006) also finds 
that, in general, output and inflation responses to common shocks (demand, supply, 
monetary policy, and external) across euro-area countries are similar, but long-lasting 
idiosyncratic shocks are responsible for output and inflation variations across coun-
tries. EC (2006) finds that country-specific shocks, including a fall in risk premia fol-
lowing the introduction of the euro, relaxation of credit constraints, and productivity 
in traded and non-traded goods are important explanatory factors for divergences. 
However, despite similarities in the transmission of shocks, differences re-
main. For example, van den Noord (2004) finds that the decline in interest rates after 
the launch of the euro had a different impact on the housing markets in the small and 
large countries and, via this channel, the shock has had a different effect on economic 
activity in the two groups. Also, Hoeller et al. (2004) argue that, as the cyclical posi-
tion of housing prices in the small countries may be out of line with the common 
monetary policy, the construction sector raises dispersions via its impact on activity. 
The results in the literature suggest that the competitiveness channel dominates 
the adjustment process in the medium run, but operates slowly. EC (2006) finds that 
the procyclical effect of the real interest rate channel has been somewhat less important 
than previously thought and dominates in the initial phase of the expansion, while in 
the medium term adjustments in competitiveness are more important. The study also 
finds that wage and price rigidities influence the efficiency of the adjustment process 
and could lead to slow correction in competitiveness and result in protracted economic 
divergences. 
The literature concludes that fiscal policy has contributed to the reduction of 
output volatility over time, but elements of procyclicality remain. Darvas et al. (2005) 
find evidence that fiscal convergence (persistently similar GDP ratios of government 
balances) is associated with synchronization of business cycles. They also observe 
that the Maastricht fiscal criterion may have moved the EMU closer to an optimal 
currency area by reducing countries’ scope to cause idiosyncratic shocks. Darvas et al. 
recognize that by imposing convergence of budget deficits, the criterion could make 
fiscal policy less effective in counteracting asymmetric shocks, but the results sug-
gest that the synchronization effect of fiscal policy has dominated. 
The literature finds that risk sharing has increased over the past decade, but 
the share of idiosyncratic shocks smoothed by the financial system is significantly 
lower in the EMU than in the United States. In particular, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, 
and Yosha (2004) find that about 10 percent of idiosyncratic (country-specific) shocks 
to the per capita gross domestic product of the EMU countries (over 1993–2000) are 
smoothed through capital markets, while the figure for the United States is 55 percent 154                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 3-4 
(over 1991–1998). Marinheiro (2003) estimates a somewhat higher share of smooth-
ed country-specific shocks for the EMU (25 percent), but still significantly lower than 
in  the United  States.  He  also  finds  that  if  financial  system  integration  in  the EMU 
reaches  the level  of  the United  States,  its  contribution  to  smoothing  idiosyncratic 
shocks could increase by about 20 percentage points.  
3. Shock Transmission and the Relative Importance of Channels 
The relative importance of the transmission channels was studied using a ge-
neral equilibrium model.
1 Equations (1)–(4) represent the core of the model, which, 
in principle, follows the New Keynesian framework.  
 
         11 21 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
y
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where yt is the output gap, hgt is the real house price gap, rgt is the real interest rate 
gap, zgt is the real exchange rate gap, and  ˆ y  stands for the current period EMU out-
put gap in a country model/the lagged output gap of a country in the EMU model, 
and is supposed to capture foreign demand. Potential output, the equilibrium interest 
rate, the equilibrium real exchange rate, and equilibrium real house prices are also 
defined in the model, which allows consistent estimates of the gaps within the model 
(for the full model specification see the Appendix). 
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where ʌt is inflation, zt is the logarithm of the real exchange rate,  ˆ S  denotes the cur-
rent period EMU inflation in a country model/the lagged inflation of a country in 
the EMU  model,  which  is  supposed  to  capture  the exogenous  cost-push  factors 
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where hgt is the real house price gap. 
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where rst is the nominal interest rate, ret is the real equilibrium interest rate, and S  is 
the inflation target. 
Equation (1) is an aggregate demand function which has a lagged term to captu-
re persistence in the data and a forward-looking component as in (Gali, Gertler 1999). 
Aggregate demand depends also on the real interest rate gap, capturing the interest 
rate channel, the real house price gap, which captures wealth effects (see (van den 
Noord, 2004), for a similar way of controlling for wealth effects on aggregate demand) 
and cyclical effects from asset prices on aggregate demand, and external demand. 
1 The model was estimated using Bayesian techniques for Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, and the EMU (weighted average of the sample countries) over three periods: 
(i) the full sample, 1980–2006; (ii) the pre-EMU period, 1980–1995; and (iii) the EMU period, 1996–2006. 
While formally the above countries renounced their monetary policy in 1999, interest rates converged
and the exchange rate ceased to be used as a policy tool as from 1996. Hence, for estimation purposes 
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Equation (2) is a standard open economy Phillips curve in which inflation is 
driven by demand conditions, exchange rate developments, and external shocks. Equa-
tion (3)  defines  the real  house  price  gap  as  a function  of  real i n terest  rates.  Real 
interest rate changes affect house prices by changing the opportunity cost of capital 
invested in housing, the cost of servicing mortgage credit, and the present value of 
future household earnings. Finally, equation (4) is a monetary policy reaction func-
tion in which the central bank cares about inflation and the output gap. 
The models were estimated using the following data: real GDP and CPI for 
each member state and the EMU; real effective exchange rates, short-term (3-month 
money market) interest rates, and real house prices (deflated by the CPI index) for 
each EMU member state. The 3-month nominal interest rate of the United States was 
used as a proxy for the foreign interest rate. The real GDP, CPI, and interest rate data 
are from Eurostat, while the nominal house prices are from the OECD.  
The general equilibrium model framework estimated with Bayesian techni-
ques has several advantages over the VAR approach in analyzing EMU dispersions. 
In particular, the general equilibrium approach is better suited for separating the va-
rious shocks that drive the dispersions than the VAR framework. By using expert 
knowledge and estimates already existing in the literature, Bayesian techniques allow 
for more robust estimation results and orthogonalization of the shocks. At the same 
time, the simultaneous estimation of more than two shocks using the VAR approach 
is increasingly data intensive and requires long time series. To ensure robust results, 
the estimates from other studies as well as our own single equation estimates are used. 
For example, the EMU parameters were chosen in line with van den Noord (2004), 
while the prior mean values of the coefficients for the EMU member states were set 
based on the ordinary least square estimates for each behavioral equation. To ensure 
robustness of the estimates, relatively diffuse prior distributions were set for the coef-
ficient estimates and the residuals.  
The impact of various shocks on the dispersions was assessed by simulating the es-
timated models for each country with that for the EMU together. The interaction of area- 
-wide and country-specific shocks takes place through the demand and supply equations 
in the model of the EMU and that of a member country. Area-wide demand and supply 
shocks are assumed to affect each country contemporaneously, while country-specific 
shocks are assumed to affect euro-area demand and inflation with a lag (Figure 1). 
The simulations with the estimated models suggest that:  
 – the EMU-related changes in interest rates have contributed to growth divergences, 
accounting on average for about 25 percent of them (Figure 1);  
FIGURE 1 
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 – the impact of house prices differs across the countries reviewed and explains about 
15 percent of the growth dispersions (Figures 2–3). 
4. Cross-country Consumption and Income Smoothing  
The degree of cross-country risk sharing and the role of the financial system 
over  time  were  estimated  using  a panel  regression  featuring  cross-country  corre-
lations of GNP/private consumption conditional on output. The idea is that the ab-
sence of a correlation between GNP/private consumption and real GDP suggests risk 
sharing, e.g., via the credit or capital markets. Thus, 
 
    ǻǻ (ǻǻ )
EA EA
i,t t t i,t t i,t xx yy D EH                              (5) 
 
where the deviation of per capita GNP/private consumption growth of country i from 
the EMU (ǻǻ
EA
i,t t x x  ) is regressed on the deviation of country i per capita real GDP 
growth from the EMU (ǻǻ
EA
i,t t y y  ), and the coefficient ȕt measures uninsured risk 
over time (ȕt = 0 means perfect risk sharing). To assess the contribution of the finan-
cial system, the time varying coefficient ȕt is specified as a function of time and the dis-
persion of financial development in the EMU countries:
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The coefficient ȕ0 measures the average uninsured risk, ȕ1 indicates how risk 
sharing evolves over time, and ȕ2 captures the effect of the financial system. A ne-
gative  ȕ2 c oefficient  lowers the degree of co-movement  between private  consum-
ption/GNP with real GDP, reducing the amount of unshared risk. Equations (5) and 
(8) were estimated for the EMU excluding Ireland and Luxembourg over the period 
1980–2006.
3 – Table 1. 
2 The GDP share of credit of deposit money banks to the private sector was used as a proxy for financial 
system development. The advantage of this indicator is that it does not consider credit issued to govern-
ments, but a shortcoming is that it captures only the role of the banking system and not that of other fi-
nancial institutions or the securities market. However, given the dominant role of banks in the EMU, using 
this indicator may not result in a large bias. In future work the following alternative indicators could be 
used as a cross-check: (i) liquid liabilities, comprising currency and interest-bearing liabilities of bank
and non-bank financial intermediaries; (ii) stock market capitalization; and (iii) the common component of 
the three measures from a principle component regression. 
3 The equations were estimated using a panel regression with cross-section weights. As a robustness check, 
equations (5)–(7) were also estimated using the full EMU sample (including Ireland and Luxembourg) as 
well as excluding the two largest EMU members (Germany and France) instead of Ireland and Luxem-
bourg. The estimation results from all three variations were reasonably stable, as the point estimates of 
the coefficients  from  all  three  samples  remained  within  ± 1  standard  deviation  of  the estimated  coef-
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The empirical results suggest that the financial system has played a role in in-
come ( = GNP) but not in private consumption risk sharing. The coefficient on the in-
teraction of financial system development with real GDP (coefficient ȕ2) is significant 
for GNP, but insignificant for private consumption. Also, the contribution of the finan-
cial system to risk sharing does not seem to have changed significantly over time, as 
the trend coefficients in both the GNP and private consumption equations are insigni-
ficant. See Figure 2. 
This  finding  suggests  that  risk  sharing  via  the financial  markets  is  better 
developed for investment (which accounts for much of the difference between GNP 
and  private  consumption)  than  for  household  consumption.
4 O n e  r e a s o n  may  be 
the still limited integration of retail banking in Europe. While the share of cross- 
-border holdings of equities by euro-area residents doubled between 1997 and 2005, 
the median share of total assets of branches of euro-area banks that are located out-
side home countries remained practically unchanged at below 3 percent of all euro- 
-area banking assets; the same figure for subsidiaries increased marginally to around 
13 percent in 2005, from around 9 percent in 2001 (ECB, 2007). Overall, it is well 
known that retail banking is appreciably less well integrated than many other fi-
nancial activities (among others, see (Decressin et al., 2007)). See Figures 3. 
The potential welfare gains from further financial integration among the EMU 
members are substantial for each euro-area country. A comparison of the volatility of 
TABLE 1  Regression Results
a
GNP Consumption 
ȕ0  0.94  0.70 
(0.13)  (0.23) 
ȕ1  -0.005  0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
ȕ2  -0.96  -0.19 
(0.18)  (0.24) 
Note:
a Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation period 1980–2006. 
 
FIGURE 2  Unshared Risk












































































































Note: 5-year moving average of coefficient ȕt in equation (5) 
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the individual euro-area members’ private consumption growth with the volatility of 
euro-area output growth suggests a high potential for additional risk sharing. Euro- 
-area output is less volatile than consumption in each member state. Specifically, at 
1.1 percentage points, the standard deviation of euro-area output growth is far lower 
than the maximum standard deviation of private consumption growth of around 3 per-
centage points and lower than the minimum standard deviation of private consump-
tion growth of 1.2 percentage points. See Figure 4. 
5. Conclusions 
EMU-related changes in interest rates and house price developments represent 
idiosyncratic shocks that have contributed to EMU inflation and growth dispersions. 
While not necessarily orthogonal to income and price level convergence, they can ac-
count for up to 40 percent of growth divergences and may largely be of a one-off nature.  
Financial sector integration has accelerated, but it has not achieved its full po-
tential. For example, as shown in the literature and confirmed in this study, the con- 
FIGURE 3  Indicators of Financial Integration 
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tribution  of  the financial  sector  to  income  smoothing  could  be  increased  signi-
ficantly – some studies suggest by 20 percentage points or more, if its level of inte-
gration reaches that of the United States. A fully integrated financial system could 
serve as a powerful insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks. It can ensure 
relatively stable consumption – funded via private rather than public borrowing and 
government intervention – despite fluctuations in domestic output. Further integra-
tion of the European capital  markets can play an important role i n this respect. 
Integration of retail banking can also contribute to risk sharing, as the resulting flow 
of cross-country interest payments will help countries smooth idiosyncratic shocks 
and incomes, lowering consumption growth dispersions in the EMU. 
FIGURE 4  Euro Area: Volatility of Member States’ Private Consumption and Euro Area 
Real GDP 
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APPENDIX 1 
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FIGURE A2  EMU: House Prices and Growth Dispersions 
 
House Prices and Growth
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FIGURE A3  EMU: Impulse Response of Output to Real House Price Shock 
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APPENDIX 2 
Dynamic General Equilibrium Model 
 




11 21 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
y
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where yt is the output gap, hgt is the real house price gap, rgt is the real interest rate 
gap, zgt is the real exchange rate gap, and  ˆ y  stands for the current period EMU out-
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ttt t lye lye g H                  (3) 
where lyet is the logarithm of potential output. 
 
GDP 
tt t ly lye y                 (4) 
where lyt is the logarithm of GDP. 
 
Phillips curve: 
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where ʌt is inflation, zt is the logarithm of the real exchange rate,  ˆ S  denotes the cur-
rent period EMU inflation in a country model/the lagged inflation of a country in 
the EMU model, and ǻ is the first difference operator. 
 
House prices 
Real house price gap 
11 1 1
hg
tt t t hg hg rg U JH                 (6) 
where hgt is the real house price gap. 
 
Growth of real house prices 
1 (1 )
gh
tt t gh gh_s gh W WH                 (7) 
where ght is growth of real house prices, and gh_s is equilibrium growth of real 
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Equilibrium real house prices 
1
he
tt t t he he gh H                  (8) 
where het is the logarithm of real equilibrium house prices. 
 
Real house prices 
ttt hh eh g                (9) 
where ht is the logarithm of real house prices. 
 
Exchange rate 
Real exchange rate gap 
tt t zg z ze                  ( 1 0 )  
where zgt is the real exchange rate gap, zt is the logarithm of the real exchange rate, 
and zet is the logarithm of the real equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
Equilibrium real exchange rate 
1
ze
ttt ze ze H                             (11) 
 
Uncovered Interest Parity 
1 ()
z
tt tt t zz r r fH                   ( 1 2 )  
where rt is the domestic interest rate, and rft is the foreign interest rate. 
 
Interest rates 
Real interest rate 
1 tt t rr sS                   ( 1 3 )  
where rt is the real interest rate, and rst is the nominal interest rate. 
 
Equilibrium real interest rate 
1 (1 )
re
tt t re re_s re - -H                  ( 1 4 )  
where ret is the real equilibrium interest rate, and re_s is the steady state real interest 
rate. 
 
Real interest rate gap 
tt t rg r re                  ( 1 5 )  
 
Monetary policy reaction function 
11 1 1 2 1 3 (1 )[ ( ) ]
rs
tt t tt t t rs rs re y G GS G S S G H                 (16) 
where rst is the nominal interest rate, ret is the real equilibrium interest rate, and S  is 
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Observable variables: Real GDP, inflation, real effective exchange rate, nominal in-
terest rates, real house prices, and foreign interest rates. 
 
Unobservable variables: Potential output, output gap, real equilibrium interest rate, 
real interest rate gap, real equilibrium exchange rate, real exchange rate gap, real 
equilibrium house price, and real house price gap. 
 
Unit root variables: Real GDP, real equilibrium house prices, real house prices, real 
exchange rate, potential output, and real equilibrium exchange rate 
 
Sample: EMU7 (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) 
 
Sample period: 1980–2006 
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